Sniffing Out the Problems: A Casenote Study of the Analysis and Effects of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Illinois v. Caballes by Basch, Amanda M.
Saint Louis University Public Law Review 
Volume 25 
Number 2 Mental Capacity and the Death 
Penalty (Volume XXV, No. 2) 
Article 10 
2006 
Sniffing Out the Problems: A Casenote Study of the Analysis and 
Effects of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Illinois v. Caballes 
Amanda M. Basch 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Basch, Amanda M. (2006) "Sniffing Out the Problems: A Casenote Study of the Analysis and Effects of the 
Supreme Court’s Decision in Illinois v. Caballes," Saint Louis University Public Law Review: Vol. 25 : No. 2 , 
Article 10. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr/vol25/iss2/10 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Saint Louis University Public Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
417 
SNIFFING OUT THE PROBLEMS: A CASENOTE STUDY OF THE 
ANALYSIS AND EFFECTS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 
IN ILLINOIS v. CABALLES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. Hypothetical1 
Imagine a client comes to you with a tale of police invasion of privacy.  
Angry and discouraged, he recounts the events of his recent move from the 
West Coast to a quiet, Midwestern city in hopes of a new start.  In the spirit of 
starting anew, the client first washed out the inside of his car, adding an air 
freshener to retain the clean smell.  Since he was required to wear suits to work 
on the West Coast, suits were practically all that he owned, so he dressed in a 
crisp suit.  Planning ahead, he hung two others in the back of the car in case the 
rest of his belongings, which were being shipped to him in his new Midwestern 
city, did not arrive in a timely manner.  In the anticipation and excitement of 
beginning his new life, he tended to drive slightly faster than the posted speed 
limit.  At one point, while traveling approximately six miles per hour over the 
speed limit, he was greeted with flashing lights in his rearview mirror.  
Somewhat annoyed that his arrival in the Midwest would be delayed, he 
begrudgingly pulled to the shoulder of the highway. 
Typical with routine traffic stops for speeding, the police officer exited his 
car, approached the client’s vehicle, and asked for the client’s license and 
registration.  Willing to cooperate, the client handed over the documents, 
which the officer took back to his car to use in performing a background 
search.  Satisfied that the client had no outstanding warrants, the officer 
returned to the client’s car and informed him that he was going to issue a 
citation for speeding.  By that time, aggravated that his arrival was being 
pushed back and he was receiving a ticket, the client began to get restless. 
The officer picked up on the client’s restlessness and began to question the 
client: Had he ever been arrested before?  Had he ever done drugs before?  Did 
 
 1. Hypothetical based loosely on the facts of People v. Caballes.  The description of the 
circumstances surrounding the car trip itself stem from the story that Caballes provided to the 
officer who actually stopped him, although it is unclear whether Caballes’ rendition is true.  See 
People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 203 (Ill. 2003), vacated and remanded by 543 U.S. 405 
(2005). 
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he currently have any drugs or other contraband in his car?2  The client 
answered all of the officer’s questions in the negative, growing more and more 
impatient with the elongated traffic stop.  Then the officer asked if the client 
would consent to a search of his vehicle, suggesting that the client should not 
mind a quick search if he does not have contraband, or anything else to hide, in 
his vehicle.  Thinking the officer had no right or reason to do so, the client 
declined to consent, only to have the officer inform the client that a second 
officer and his drug-sniffing canine had just arrived to assist in the traffic stop.  
Still in the process of writing out the speeding citation, the original officer 
asked the client to step out of the vehicle while the second officer walked the 
dog around the vehicle.  The dog alerted to the trunk area of the car, and the 
officers began searching the trunk. 3 
The client, upset at what he feels was an invasion of his privacy and a 
blatant disregard for his wishes not to have his vehicle searched, now asks you 
whether this sequence of events was legal.  After all, as the client points out, he 
had only been stopped for speeding and had already declined consent to search 
before the canine began the sniff. 
B. The Solution in Illinois v. Caballes 
In early 2005, the United States Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of a suspicionless canine sniff performed during the course of 
 
 2. Many courts recognize this type of questioning as constitutional.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Francis, 140 F.App’x. 184, 186 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 
1274, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001) and noting that “[o]nly unrelated questions which unreasonably 
prolong the detention are unlawful”); United States v. Galindo-Gonzales, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 
1020 (Dist. N.M. 1996), aff’d, 142 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 1998); but cf. United States v. Murillo, 
255 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that “[d]uring a traffic stop, a police officer is 
allowed to ask questions that are reasonably related in scope to the justification for his initiation 
of contact[,]” but that “[i]n order to broaden the scope of questioning, he must articulate 
suspicious factors that are particularized and objective”), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 948 (2002).  Even 
under a Murillo type of analysis of the questioning at issue here, an argument could possibly be 
made that the questioning regarding whether Caballes had drugs in his vehicle was warranted 
because the officer could articulate suspicious, particularized, and objective factors, namely that 
Caballes appeared agitated, said that he was moving but had no belongings with him, was 
wearing a suit to move, and smelled of air freshener. 
 3. Several courts consider a drug sniffing canine’s alert to constitute probable cause to 
search an area.  See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
516 U.S. 1182 (1996); United States v. Jeffus, 22 F.3d 554, 557 (4th Cir. 1994); Romo v. 
Champion, 46 F.3d 1013, 1020 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523, 
1527 (10th Cir. 1993)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 947 (1995).  For a discussion of why probable 
cause that there are drugs in the vehicle allows the police to automatically search the vehicle 
without first obtaining a warrant, see infra Section II(B), entitled “The Fourth Amendment and 
Vehicle Searches.”  For a discussion of the possible problems with the automatic creation of 
probable cause through canine alerts, see infra Section VI(B), entitled “Alternative Analyses.” 
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a routine traffic stop for a traffic violation in Illinois v. Caballes.4  The Court 
held that a canine sniff of the exterior of a car during a legitimate stop for a 
traffic violation did not constitute a search of the vehicle and, therefore, did not 
warrant Fourth Amendment protection,5 overruling the Illinois Supreme 
Court’s decision to the contrary and allowing the subsequent prosecution of 
Caballes to include evidence of drugs found in his trunk during the traffic 
stop.6 
This Casenote examines the soundness of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Illinois v. Caballes.  Beginning with Part II, this Casenote explains the 
constitutional history relevant to a complete understanding of where the 
decision fits in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, focusing on the specific 
rules governing contraband and automobiles.  It then examines in Part III the 
Fourth Amendment arguments for both the State of Illinois and Mr. Caballes, 
as well as the analytical approaches taken by the Illinois courts and the United 
States Supreme Court in applying search and seizure law to the Caballes case.  
Part IV turns to the decisions of lower courts and reviews the subsequent 
handling of the Caballes analysis and holding, focusing on the practical 
consequences the decision has produced.  Finally, Part V focuses on what the 
author believes to be the problematic implications of the Caballes decision.  
Part V also offers several alternative analyses the United States Supreme Court 
may have used in making its decision in the case.  This Casenote ultimately 
concludes that the decision in Illinois v. Caballes likely will produce 
undesirable effects that counter public policy, but that could have been avoided 
had the Court utilized any of several different methods for analyzing the case. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment declares that “[t]he right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”7  The Fourteenth Amendment applies the 
protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to state governments.8  
Although the United States Supreme Court originally interpreted a “search” 
under the Fourth Amendment as being associated with and determined by only 
the targeted location of the state action,9 the Court drastically altered this 
 
 4. See generally Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
 5. Id. at 410. 
 6. Id. 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 8. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state from “mak[ing] or enforce[ing] any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . . “  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV. 
 9. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that wiretapping did not 
constitute a search and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the actual wires 
subject to the wiretapping were not a part of the person, papers, or effects named in the Fourth 
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analysis in Katz v. United States.10  Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz set 
forth the test subsequently used by the Court for whether the Fourth 
Amendment applied to specified state actions of invasions of privacy: first, the 
person against whom the search was performed had to exhibit a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the objects to be searched; second, the expectation of 
privacy had to be “one that society [was] prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”11 
A. The Fourth Amendment and Contraband 
Focusing on the second prong of Harlan’s Katz test, the United States 
Supreme Court has emphasized the lack of an objective “reasonable” 
expectation of privacy in contraband of any kind.12  Accordingly, the Court has 
held that state conduct revealing contraband, and only contraband, does not 
infringe upon a reasonable expectation of privacy and thus does not implicate 
Fourth Amendment protections.13 
In United States v. Place, the Court considered whether the temporary 
detention of a man’s luggage in order to perform a canine sniff of the luggage 
violated the Fourth Amendment.14  In Place, officers at the Miami 
International Airport observed Place engaging in suspicious behavior while he 
was waiting to purchase a ticket to New York, but because his flight was 
departing soon, the officers allowed him to take his scheduled flight to New 
York.15  The officers did, however, have the opportunity to observe that 
Place’s luggage tags listed addresses which did not match each other or the 
address corresponding to the phone number he had provided to the airline.16  
 
Amendment and because the wiretapping was not the equivalent of trespassing into the 
defendant’s house). 
 10. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967). 
 11. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  Under this test, a man’s conversation in an enclosed 
phone booth was held to be protected by the Fourth Amendment because the man had, by 
shutting the door to the booth, exhibited a subjective expectation that his conversation would be 
private and because society would recognize as reasonable the expectation that a conversation in 
an enclosed phone booth would be private.  Id. 
 12. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (recognizing no legitimate 
privacy interest in the possession of cocaine); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) 
(recognizing no reasonable interest in possession of contraband). 
 13. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123; Place, 462 U.S. at 707. 
 14. Place, 462 U.S. at 697-98.  The Court’s Place decision was, however, foreshadowed by 
a footnote in a prior decision in which the Court specifically stated that “officers, with founded 
suspicion, could have detained [the suspect] for the brief period during which Florida authorities 
at busy airports seem able to carry out the dog sniffing procedure.”  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491, 506 n. 10 (1983). 
 15. Place, 462 U.S. at 698. 
 16. Id. 
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Because of their suspicion, the Miami officers contacted officers at the New 
York airport, advising them of the situation.17 
The New York officers also observed Place engaging in suspicious 
behavior and approached Place, who falsely claimed his luggage had already 
been searched in Miami.18  Place declined consent to search his luggage, at 
which point the officers seized the luggage and transported it to a separate 
airport in New York in order to subject the luggage to a canine sniff.19  More 
than an hour and a half after having seized the luggage from Place, the officers 
actually subjected the luggage to a sniff; the canine alerted to one of the two 
seized bags, and the officers detained the “alert” bag over the weekend in order 
to obtain a search warrant.20  Upon receiving the warrant and personally 
searching the bag, the officers found over 1,000 grams of cocaine.21  Place’s 
subsequent conviction for possession and intent to distribute reached the 
United States Supreme Court after the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York denied Place’s motion to suppress the evidence 
gained from the search because the officers had reasonable suspicion that the 
luggage contained drugs and after the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit reversed the denial due to the prolonged nature of the seizure of 
the luggage.22 
Because the police could, based on their observations of Place’s actions 
and the inconsistent addresses, articulate some reasonable suspicion that 
Place’s luggage contained contraband, the Supreme Court approved of a 
temporary detention of the luggage “provided that the investigative detention 
[was] properly limited in scope.”23  The Court then weighed the extent of the 
intrusion against Place’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy and concluded 
that temporary detention for the purposes of performing a non-intrusive, sui 
generis24 canine sniff did not weigh heavily on the man’s unreasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contraband in the luggage and in fact did not 
constitute a search at all under the Fourth Amendment.25  The Court did, 
however, place a temporal limitation on the detention of the luggage for the 
purposes of obtaining a canine sniff, considering both the actual length of the 
detention and the diligence exercised by the police in obtaining the canine 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 698-99. 
 19. Id. at 699. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Place, 462 U.S. at 699. 
 22. Id. at 699-700. 
 23. Id. at 706. 
 24. The Court considered canine sniffs to be sui generis precisely because they are non-
intrusive and reveal only the presence of contraband.  A sui generis search is one that is “unique” 
or “of its own kind.”  BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY 502 (5th ed. 2003).  Place, 462 U.S. at 707. 
 25. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. 
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sniff, although it declined to put a per se temporal limitation on detentions of 
personal effects.26  On the specific facts of Place, the Court determined that, 
because the officers had advance warning of the need for the drug sniffing 
canine but still did not bring the canine to the appropriate airport, the officers 
did not act with diligence in obtaining the sniff.27 
In accordance with its decision in Place, the United States Supreme Court 
decided United States v. Jacobsen the following year, in which a substance 
seized from a suspect was subjected to chemical testing to discover whether 
the substance was illegal.28  The Court held that the chemical testing did not 
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment because the chemical testing 
revealed, and was able to reveal, only contraband in which the defendant did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.29 
B. The Fourth Amendment and Vehicle Searches 
In addition to a practically non-existent privacy interest in contraband, 
individuals also have a diminished privacy interest in their vehicles, such that a 
warrant is not always, or even typically, required in order for police to search 
an automobile.30 
For example, if a subject is arrested in, near, or immediately after exiting 
his vehicle, then a search incident to arrest may include the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle as well as the individual himself.31  The Supreme 
Court expressly allowed for searches of the person incident to arrest in Chimel 
v. California, reasoning that the need to ensure officer safety and to avoid the 
possible destruction of evidence outweighed the arrestee’s Fourth Amendment 
 
 26. Id. at 708-09.  Under this standard, the officers in Place exceeded the temporal limits of 
the detention when they detained the luggage for ninety minutes but were actually capable of 
having the canine available to perform the sniff at the airport where Place arrived and as soon as 
the luggage was detained.  Id. at 709-10. 
 27. Id. at 709-10. 
 28. See United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984). 
 29. Id. at 123. 
 30. In addition to the two justifications for vehicle searches discussed here, police may 
perform a valid vehicle search through an “inventory search.”  Officers may use an inventory 
search whenever an arrestee has been apprehended from his vehicle or a vehicle is impounded.  
The inventory search involves three interrelated justifications: (1) to protect the property of the 
owner of the vehicle; (2) to protect the police from theft claims by the vehicle’s owner; and (3) to 
protect the police from potentially harmful items in the vehicle, such as a bomb.  South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976).  One limitation on this type of search is that the police 
department performing the inventory search must have a policy that requires such a search.  See 
id. at 372.  The inventory search is not typically applicable to situations like that in Caballes, 
although such a search may have come into play in the Caballes case had Caballes been arrested 
for his speeding violation rather than merely given a citation. 
 31. See, e.g., Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 621 (2004); New York v. Belton, 453 
U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). 
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right to privacy in his person.32  This rationale was subsequently extended to 
allow for the search of an arrestee’s vehicle incident to arrest, so long as the 
arrestee was seized in, near, or immediately after exiting the vehicle.33  
However, the Court did limit the scope of a valid search of an automobile 
incident to arrest to the passenger compartment of the vehicle, which did not 
include the trunk.34 
Under United States Supreme Court precedent, officers may arrest 
motorists for violating civil traffic laws without violating the Fourth 
Amendment.35  The United States Supreme Court approved of such arrests in 
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,36 implicitly allowing for searches of automobiles 
incident to arrests for traffic violations.37  The Court has, however, expressly 
rejected the vehicle search incident to citation, since the officer safety and 
preservation of evidence rationales do not apply as readily to citations as they 
do to arrests.38 
Absent an arrest, but with probable cause, officers may still search a 
vehicle without a warrant in some circumstances.39  This so-called “automobile 
exception,” justified by the mobility of the vehicle, applies whenever the police 
have probable cause to believe a search of the vehicle will reveal contraband or 
evidence of a crime.40  Sixty years after creating the automobile exception, the 
Court in California v. Carney added the “diminished expectation of privacy” 
rationale to the justifications for the automobile exception, explaining that 
individuals have a diminished expectation of privacy in their vehicles because 
of the widespread government regulation of automobiles.41 
C. Canine Sniffs, Vehicle Searches, and the Fourth Amendment 
Forced to combine its contraband and automobile precedents in City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, the United States Supreme Court considered the 
 
 32. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63. 
 33. See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 621; Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. 
 34. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 623; Belton, 453 U.S. at 461 n.4. 
 35. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). 
 36. Id. 
 37. The fact that searches incident to arrest had been allowed for nearly forty years before 
Atwater was decided and the fact that the court discussed no limitations on police activity 
incident to arrest for a civil traffic violation implies that the Court intended to allow for such 
searches.  See id. at 354. 
 38. See generally Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998). 
 39. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1985); Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925). 
 40. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.  The temporal limits on the ability to search were addressed in 
Chambers v. Maroney, in which the Court rejected a search conducted after the police had 
brought the vehicle back to the station and required that the search be conducted at the scene 
where the vehicle was originally encountered.  See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
 41. Carney, 471 U.S. at 392-93. 
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implications of valid traffic stops together with canine sniffs, although only in 
the context of roadblocks stops and not in the context of stops for traffic 
violations.42  In Edmond, the Court first examined the validity of roadblock 
stops for the primary purpose of performing canine sniffs on vehicles.43  The 
Court distinguished between roadblocks with the primary purpose of 
discovering drunk drivers (i.e., those in which sobriety tests were 
administered) and those with the primary purpose of controlling drug crime 
(i.e., those in which canine sniffs were conducted).44  The Court disallowed 
canine sniffs as the primary purpose of a roadblock because the sniffs did not 
serve the safety purposes necessary to justify roadblocks.45  The Court did not 
stop its analysis there, however, and turned to the issue of validity of the 
canine sniff itself.  Emphasizing that canine sniffs are not searches for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, the Court was careful to point out that the canine sniff 
itself did not invalidate the roadblock; the sniff did not turn a valid roadblock 
stop into an invalid search.46  In other words, the Court implied that a valid 
roadblock, one designed to discover drunk drivers, could potentially involve 
the use of canine sniffs as its secondary purpose without being deemed an 
unconstitutional stop or search of the vehicle.47 
Before the Supreme Court’s determination of Caballes, an officer in most 
jurisdictions was prohibited from terminating the traffic stop by issuing a 
citation or warning, returning the motorist’s documents, and only then 
informing the motorist that he was required to wait for the drug sniffing canine 
to arrive on the scene.48  This distinction had less to do with the actual act of 
the canine sniff and more to do with the illegal detention of the motorist 
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.49  Despite this bright-line rule, 
some courts were willing to accept as legal a canine sniff occurring 
 
 42. See generally City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).  Roadblock stops are 
distinguishable from traffic violation stops in that roadblocks involve no reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause and require only a public safety justification, whereas traffic violation stops 
require at least reasonable suspicion, and more often involve probable cause, that a traffic 
violation has occurred.  This distinction becomes important to the United States Supreme Court 
when analyzing Caballes.  See infra Section III(C), entitled “The Court’s Analysis.” 
 43. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34. 
 44. See id. at 41-42. 
 45. Id. at 44. 
 46. Id. at 40. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See, e.g., United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1135-36 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 49. Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” From Start to Finish: Too Much 
“Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1894-95 (2004).  Once the 
citation was issued and the driver’s documents returned, the legal stop for a traffic violation 
terminated, and any subsequent detention required probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or some 
other justification.  Id. 
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immediately after the termination of the traffic stop.50  In the wake of this 
weak prohibition, Caballes had the potential to formulate a rule workable for 
officers and courts but also fair to motorists. 
III.  FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
A. Procedural History of Illinois v. Caballes 
When the United States Supreme Court received the Illinois v. Caballes 
case, both parties to the case had experienced acceptance and rejection of their 
arguments in the Illinois state courts.  Both the trial court and the appellate 
court ruled against Caballes in his motion to suppress the drugs discovered in 
his trunk after the police, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, 
conducted a canine sniff of his vehicle during a traffic stop for speeding.51  The 
appellate court based its holding on the assertion that canine sniffs do not 
require even reasonable suspicion in order to be legal.52 
Not surprisingly,53 the Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with the lower 
courts and held that the trial court should have granted Caballes’ motion to 
suppress the drugs discovered in Caballes’ trunk as a result of the canine sniff 
and subsequent search.54  The Illinois Court based its decision on People v. 
Cox,55 a case with facts similar to those in Caballes, in which the Illinois 
Supreme Court applied the Terry test56 to decide whether a canine sniff was 
 
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, 302 F.3d 805, 810 (8th Cir. 2002) (requiring a 
showing that the sniff itself was unduly lengthy in order to constitute an illegal detention), cert. 
denied, 538 U.S. 992 (2003); State v. Box, 73 P.3d 623, 629 (Ariz. 2003).  This may have been so 
because of evidentiary considerations (it would be difficult to show that the sniff was performed 
after the issuance of the citation, or vice versa) or it may have been so because courts simply felt 
the benefits of discovering drug trafficking or use outweighed the seemingly insignificant 
intrusion into the driver’s privacy and time. 
 51. People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 203-04 (Ill. 2003). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Incidentally, the Illinois courts have consistently limited the scope of actions officers 
may take during or after a traffic stop, although not always with the approval of the United States 
Supreme Court.  See, e.g., People v. Harris, 802 N.E.2d 219, 231 (Ill. 2003) (holding that a 
warrant check not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion violated the Fourth 
Amendment), vacated, 543 U.S. 1135 (2005); People v. Bunch, 796 N.E.2d 1024, 1030-31 (Ill. 
2003) (prohibiting questioning not connected to the purpose of the initial stop), cert. denied, 541 
U.S. 959 (2004); People v. Gherna, 784 N.E.2d 799, 811 (Ill. 2003) (extended detention of 
motorist found unreasonable); People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275, 281 (Ill. 2002) (canine sniff not 
permitted during traffic stop for traffic violation), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 937 (2003); People v. 
Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556, 566 (Ill. 1999) (consent rendered void by actions of officer). 
 54. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 205. 
 55. See generally People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275 (Ill. 2002). 
 56. The Terry test asks (1) whether the officer’s action was justified in the first place and (2) 
whether any subsequent action was reasonably related in scope to the justification of the officer’s 
initial actions.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968). 
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reasonable.57  The Court noted that although Terry itself did not deal with a 
traffic stop, Illinois and federal courts had previously applied the Terry test to 
traffic stop situations; therefore, the Illinois Court determined that the Terry 
test was applicable to Caballes.58  Since the officer initially had probable cause 
to stop Caballes for speeding, the first prong of the Terry test was satisfied and 
only the second prong presented an issue for the Illinois Court.59  Referring to 
its analysis in Cox, the Court required “‘specific and articulable facts’ to 
support the stopping officer’s request for the canine unit,” which the Court 
could not find on the facts of Caballes since the stopping officer had not 
smelled marijuana or observed other factors that would have led him to believe 
that Caballes had marijuana in his trunk.60  The Court rejected the argument 
that the lack of belongings in Caballes’ car, the smell of air freshener, 
Caballes’ business dress, and Caballes’ nervousness constituted enough 
evidence for reasonable suspicion to perform the sniff.61  Because the officer 
could not produce the requisite specific and articulable facts, the Court held 
that the canine sniff unreasonably broadened the scope of the stop in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment.62  As a result, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed 
the lower courts and held that Caballes’ motion to suppress the evidence 
discovered as a result of the canine sniff should have been granted.63 
B. The Argument for Illinois 
In its brief to the United States Supreme Court, Illinois relied heavily on 
the U.S. Supreme Court precedent established in Place, which stated that 
canine sniffs for drug detection purposes were not searches.64  Reiterating the 
argument in Place that a canine sniff does not reveal any non-contraband 
items, Illinois argued that canine sniffs truly are sui generis, thus, they do not 
constitute searches and do not implicate Fourth Amendment protections.65  
Illinois further argued that canine sniffs actually enhance Fourth Amendment 
protections by exposing individuals to the least intrusive means of discovering 
whether they are carrying contraband.66  Citing several cases in which the U.S. 
 
 57. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 204. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 204-05. 
 62. Id. at 204.  The Court noted that the fact that the stopping officer had not summoned the 
canine officer himself was of no consequence, since “the overall effect remains the same.”  Id. at 
204. 
 63. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 205. 
 64. Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923), 2004 
WL 1530261 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
 65. Id. at 6. 
 66. Id. at 6-7.  Apparently, the logic here is that the right to privacy is preserved when only 
minimal intrusions are used to gain information. 
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Supreme Court utilized the holding in Place without questioning it, Illinois 
further asserted that the principles underlying Place were established 
constitutional law.67 
In order to round out its claim that the particular vehicle sniff in Caballes 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the State relied on the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, where the Court 
reaffirmed the use of canine sniffs in accord with the Fourth Amendment but 
disapproved of the initial stopping of vehicles absent reasonable suspicion, 
probable cause, or a justifying safety purpose.68  Illinois argued that because 
the Court specifically stated that the use of a canine sniff did not turn the stop 
into a search in Edmond, the canine sniff also did not turn the stop into a search 
in Caballes.69 
In addition, Illinois also attempted a “plain smell” argument.70  Under this 
rationale, individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the smells 
in the common air, such as the smell of marijuana emanating from a vehicle’s 
trunk.71  Because the officers would have been able to search the car if they 
could smell the marijuana, the State argued that the officers were likewise 
justified in searching the car because the canine could smell the marijuana and 
alert the officers to its detection.72  In both cases, the marijuana was within 
“plain smell.”73 
Turning to the analytical framework question, the State claimed that the 
Illinois Supreme Court erred in applying the Terry two-pronged test to 
determine the validity of the canine sniff.74  Illinois first argued that the Terry 
standard “[did] not govern a canine sniff of the exterior of a vehicle at a traffic 
stop supported by probable cause” because the Terry standard applied only to 
stops in which the police merely had reasonable suspicion and nothing more.75  
Responding to Caballes’ assertion that the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Berkemer v. McCarty supported the application of the Terry 
standard, Illinois cited a footnote in Berkemer that apparently limited the 
effects of the Court’s analogy.76  Before concluding this precedent established 
 
 67. Id. at 7. 
 68. Id. at 7-8. 
 69. Id. at 8. 
 70. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 64, at 8-10. 
 71. Id. at 9. 
 72. Id. at 10. 
 73. See id. at 8-10.  This argument plays on the “plain sight” doctrine, under which officers 
may seize contraband within the plain sight of officers who are legally on the premises or are 
conducting legal activities (essentially if the contraband is out in the open where anyone could 
view it).  See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) for a brief explanation. 
 74. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 64, at 11. 
 75. Id. at 12. 
 76. Id. at 13-14.  The footnote reads: “No more is implied by this analogy than that most 
traffic stops resemble, in duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry.  
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that Terry did not apply to the Caballes situation, Illinois cited several other 
decisions by the United States Supreme Court which, although not raised by 
Caballes, did not support the application of Terry to traffic stops for traffic 
violations.77 
Illinois also claimed that even if Terry were applicable, the canine sniff 
passed the Terry standard, although it did not explain this position.78  The 
reasoning may simply have been that the sniff was analogous to the pat-down 
in Terry itself in that it neither significantly intruded upon the stopped person’s 
privacy because both were designed to detect only specific items (drugs in the 
canine sniff and weapons dangerous to officer safety in the Terry pat-down).  
The reasoning also may have been that the canine sniff was not a search at all, 
so that a sniff that did not unreasonably prolong a stop could not be deemed a 
violation of Terry.  In fact, on this issue, the Amici Curiae Brief filed by 
Arkansas and Twenty-Seven Other States asserted that a canine sniff does not 
impermissibly expand the scope of a traffic violation stop simply because a 
canine sniff is what the Amici Brief referred to as a Fourth Amendment “non-
event.”79  According to the Brief, this is because canine sniffs do not interfere 
with the stopped person’s freedom any more than the initial stop, which, in the 
case of Caballes’ stop, was supported by probable cause.80  The Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner offered another rationale 
for why the canine sniff at issue passed the Terry test,81 if that were even the 
applicable test.  The United States in its Brief claimed that during a Terry stop, 
officers may use reasonable means to confirm or dispel any reasonable 
suspicion that they may have regarding the subject and that under this analysis, 
the canine sniff that does not physically intrude upon the subject’s privacy and 
quickly confirms or dispels the officer’s suspicion is a reasonable tool which 
passes the Terry test.82 
 
We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the 
bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop.”  Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 
U.S. 420, 440 n.29 (1984). 
 77. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 64, at 15 (citing Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 
542 U.S. 960 (2004); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 683-88 (1985); Atwater v. City of 
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771 (2001)). 
 78. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 64, at 12. 
 79. Brief of Arkansas and Twenty-Seven Other States as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 13-14, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923), 2004 WL 1475506. 
 80. Id. at 14. 
 81. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 17, Caballes, 543 
U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923), 2004 WL 1530263. 
 82. Id. at 17-18.  This logic, at least at first glance, seems to be flawed in that the officer 
obviously is allowed to use reasonable means for confirming or dispelling the reasonable 
suspicion that gave rise to the stop initially, but the claimed “reasonable suspicion” did not exist 
here and was not the initial reason for the stop. 
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While not connected to any specific legal argument already raised by the 
parties or the other amici, the Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police and the 
Major Cities Chiefs Association (the “Associations”) added another 
justification for allowing canine sniffs such as the one in the Caballes case.83  
Claiming that the canine sniffs were minimal intrusions on the privacy of those 
stopped during traffic violation stops, the Associations argued that such sniffs 
played a vital role in detecting harmful and prevalent contraband and that 
without the sniffs, officers would not be able to effectively fight the War on 
Drugs.84  The Associations’ argument provided yet another justification for 
Illinois for allowing the canine sniff in Caballes. 
C. The Argument for Caballes 
In his brief to the United States Supreme Court, Caballes began by 
confronting the argument presented by Illinois that the canine sniff does not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment.85  In response to the argument that canine 
sniffs are not physically intrusive, Caballes argued that the extremely well-
established rule from Katz precluded such an argument, since Katz itself held 
that a conversation heard with devices outside of the telephone booth was 
nonetheless protected by the Fourth Amendment.86  Likewise, the United 
States Supreme Court’s recent decision that using thermal-imaging constituted 
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment undermined the 
physical intrusion argument.87 
On the issue of the analogy of the canine sniff to the “plain view” doctrine, 
Caballes claimed that the act of bringing a canine to the scene of a traffic stop 
was not the same as merely opening ones eyes to what is within sight; in other 
words, police officers, under “plain view,” are not required to ignore what they 
can obviously see, but the canine sniff situation involves assertive action to 
bring the dog to the search.88  Rebutting the claim by Illinois that canine sniffs 
are not embarrassing or inconvenient, Caballes claimed that, on the contrary, 
 
 83. Brief of Amici Curiae The Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police and The Major Cities 
Chiefs Association in Support of Petitioner at 4, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923), 
2004 WL 1530262. 
 84. Id. at 4-6. 
 85. Brief for Respondent at 13, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923), 2004 WL 
2097415 [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. 
 86. Id. at 13-14. 
 87. Id. at 14.  In Kyllo v. United States, agents from the U.S. Department of the Interior used 
a thermal imager to view heat sources within the defendant’s house.  Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001).  The Court, rejecting the government’s argument that the thermal imager 
revealed only the heat radiating from the house, held that use of the thermal imager constituted a 
search under the Fourth Amendment because it was a “through the wall” device (as opposed to an 
“off the wall” device) that revealed intimate, private activity within the house, such as when the 
occupants of the house took baths or showers.  Id. at 34-36. 
 88. Brief for Respondent, supra note 85, at 15-16. 
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the experience of being pulled over, singled out, and then searched in plain 
view of other motorists who are not receiving the same treatment indeed 
embarrasses and inconveniences the individual who is stopped.89  In addition, 
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and the ACLU of Illinois in 
their Amici Brief asserted that not only is the use of a drug-sniffing canine 
potentially embarrassing and inconvenient, but it is also intimidating to many 
drivers, most of which are innocent.90  In addition, the ACLU pointed out that 
these canines may be dangerous to drivers and have been reported as biting or 
even attacking drivers, making the canine sniff potentially much more than just 
inconvenient.91 
Finally, in response to the argument that canine sniffs reveal only 
contraband, Caballes conceded that properly conducted sniffs will typically 
reveal only contraband; however, Caballes asserted that this did not mean that 
the subjects of canine sniffs do not deserve Fourth Amendment protection.92  
Caballes pointed out that Kyllo, in determining whether the Fourth Amendment 
applies, demands consideration of the nature of the place to be searched as well 
as the nature of the items sought, asserting that, although there may have been 
little privacy interest in the contraband itself, there was still a privacy interest 
in the trunk, which called for Fourth Amendment protection.93  Caballes also 
produced evidence from other cases and studies questioning the reliability of 
canine sniffs.94  For example, Caballes cited one case in which evidence 
showed that of twenty-eight canine alerts, only one resulted in the discovery of 
illegal drugs, implying that canine sniffs do not always signal the presence of 
contraband.95  In addition, Caballes asserted that canines often alert to smells 
other than that of large amounts of contraband, such as another dog or 
money.96  Finally, Caballes presented evidence that canines can produce false 
alerts as a result of errors by the officer himself, such as failing to distinguish 
 
 89. Id. at 17. 
 90. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Illinois as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondent at 17-18, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923), 2004 WL 
2097416. 
 91. Id. at 18-19. 
 92. Brief for Respondent, supra note 85, at 17.  The Court seizes on this language to support 
its own analysis, ignoring the pages of qualifications that follow the initial statement.  See 
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409; see also infra Section III(C), entitled “The Court’s Analysis.” 
 93. Brief for Respondent, supra note 85, at 18. 
 94. Id. at 18-19. 
 95. Id. (citing Merret v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1549 (11th Cir. 1995)). 
 96. Id. at 19 (citing Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (N.D. Ind. 1978) (in which a 
canine reacted to the smell of another dog); United States v. $506,231 in U.S. Currency, 125 F.3d 
442, 453 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
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between true alerts and mere “interest” in an area, or using a canine without 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.97 
Turning to his own assertive arguments, Caballes first claimed that the 
sniff of his vehicle was constitutionally unreasonable without a showing of 
reasonable suspicion to believe that his vehicle contained drugs.98  Conceding 
that probable cause is not always required to justify a search, Caballes argued 
that balancing his even slight interest in the privacy within his trunk with the 
non-existent safety justifications for performing the sniff, his privacy interests 
demanded that the sniff not be performed.99 
Applying Terry v. Ohio, which Caballes thought to be the test applicable to 
his circumstances, Caballes asserted that although the police had probable 
cause to stop him for speeding, they did not have probable cause to believe that 
he was carrying drugs.100  Therefore, the canine sniff violated the Terry bar 
against broadening the scope of a stop beyond that which initiated the stop.101 
Finally, Caballes made a policy argument that possible problems with 
pretextual stops required a bar against using canine sniffs during traffic stops 
without any reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe a motorist had 
contraband,102 even in light of the Whren v. United States decision. 
D. The Court’s Analysis 
The Court first addressed Caballes’ reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the contents of his vehicle.  Citing its own decision in Jacobsen, the Court 
asserted that Caballes had no reasonable expectation to privacy in the drugs in 
his trunk.103  The logical conclusion, at least for the Court following its 
analysis in Jacobsen, was that any state conduct that uncovers only the 
presence of the drugs in the trunk is presumed to be legitimate.104 
The Court responded to Caballes’ arguments against canine sniffs being 
sui generis by citing the point in Caballes’ own brief where he claimed “drug 
 
 97. Id. at 20 (citing United States v. Guzman, 75 F.3d 1090, 1096 (6th Cir. 1996); and 
Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of the Narcotics Detection Dog, 
85 KY. L.J. 405, 430 (1997) (asserting that canine sniffs are “least effective when they survey a 
random population”)). 
 98. Id. at 20. 
 99. Brief for Respondent, supra note 85, at 21-22. 
 100. Id. at 23-24. 
 101. Id. at 23. 
 102. Id. at 32-34.  The U.S. Supreme Court held in Whren v. United States that the individual 
intentions of stopping officers do not play a role in deciding whether a stop is constitutional.  
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
 103. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005).  The Court’s reasoning necessarily 
focuses on the drugs in the trunk, as the Court would not have asserted that Caballes had no 
reasonable expectation to privacy in any legal contents in his trunk.  See California v. Acevedo, 
500 U.S. 565, 573 (1991) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982)). 
 104. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. 
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sniffs are designed, and if properly conducted are generally likely, to reveal 
only the presence of contraband.”105  The Court went further, however, and 
rejected the argument that even if canine sniffs were sometimes in error, 
private information would be exposed to police.106  Furthermore, regardless of 
the possible hypothetical problems with canine sniffs in general, the Court 
recognized that the trial court had found no such problems with the specific 
sniff in Caballes, allowing the Court to dismiss the notion of canine reliability 
altogether.107  In addition, the Court found this conclusion to be in line with its 
recent decision in Kyllo v. United States, in which it held that thermal-imaging 
detection without a warrant or probable cause violated the Fourth 
Amendment.108  The Court distinguished canine sniffs, through which only 
drugs can be detected, from thermal-imaging detection, through which private 
details such as when someone takes a bath, which do not necessarily reveal the 
presence of contraband, could potentially be revealed.109 
Since Caballes did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
drugs in his trunk, the minimal intrusion presented by the canine sniff did not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment.110  Accordingly, the Court placed no 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion requirement on the ability to conduct a 
canine sniff for drugs during a legitimate traffic stop for a traffic violation, 
noting, however, that “a seizure . . . justified solely by the interest in issuing a 
warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if . . . prolonged beyond the 
time reasonably required to complete [the issuance].”111  In other words, the 
Court placed a “reasonableness” limitation on the duration of such encounters 
but refused to put any other limitations on the ability of police to conduct 
canine sniffs during the course of a traffic stop or even to expand on what 
“reasonable” may mean in a traffic stop situation.112 
 
 105. Id. at 409 (citing Brief for Respondent, supra note 85, at 17). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  Presumably, had the canine in Caballes’ specific case presented a question of the 
reliability of the individual canine’s sniffs, then the Court could have addressed the issue further.  
From the Court’s analysis, however, it is unclear whether one particular canine’s unreliability 
would cause the Court to disallow canine sniffs of this sort in general.  In other words, even if 
Caballes had been successful in arguing the unreliability of the specific canine in his case, other 
defendants in similar situations would not necessarily benefit from Caballes’ success, since 
canine sniffs in general are still considered to be reliable, sui generis tools. 
 108. See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 109. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 407. 
 112. This limitation on the duration actually has nothing to do with the canine sniff itself but 
rather points to the fact that a prolonged detention of a driver beyond the time required to issue 
the warning or citation could result in the detention being deemed an arrest for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, an arrest for which the officer would have no probable cause or likely even 
reasonable suspicion.  Id. 
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E. Justice Souter’s Dissent 
In his avid dissent from the Court’s majority opinion, Justice Souter 
attacked not only the holding the Court reached but also the precedent upon 
which that holding was based.113  He began his dissent by calling into question 
the analysis used by the Court to make its decision in Place, specifically, the 
classification of canine sniffs as sui generis.114  Citing several opinions dealing 
with the accuracy of canine sniff alerts, Justice Souter concluded that at least 
“dozens” of alerts out of “hundreds” will actually be false positives.115  The 
prevalence of such false positives suggested that canine sniffs are, at least 
some of the time, revealing something other than the presence of drugs116 
meaning canine sniffs are not sui generis after all.117 
Responding to the Court’s suggestion that canine sniffs, reliable or not, do 
not reveal any non-contraband items in an individual’s possession, Justice 
Souter aptly noted that although the sniff itself may not reveal non-contraband 
items, “the sniff is the first step in a process that may disclose ‘intimate details’ 
without revealing contraband.”118  While searches are allowed to reveal non-
contraband items if conducted with probable cause, and in most cases, a 
warrant, the operative words for Justice Souter were “searches” and “with 
probable cause.”119  Justice Souter did not suggest that drug sniffing canines 
may never be used, only that their use constitutes a search requiring probable 
cause.120  In this sense, the canine sniff at issue was, in Justice Souter’s 
opinion, more akin to the thermal-imaging search in Kyllo v. United States, as 
both the canine sniff and the thermal imager could potentially produce 
evidence of contraband as well as legitimate activities.121 
 
 113. See id. at 410-17 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 114. Id. at 410-13 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 115. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411-12 (Souter, J., dissenting).  The “dozens” out of “hundreds” 
language raises an interesting question as to how reliable canine sniffs would have to be in order 
to qualify as sui generis searches.  Perhaps the Majority would accept even “dozens” of false 
alerts as minimal enough to justify the sui generis label, in which case Souter’s argument does 
nothing to counter the Court’s justifications for allowing the sniffs.  As the Court said in its own 
opinion, however, the issue in this particular case seemed to be irrelevant.  Id. at 409 (majority 
opinion). 
 116. Justice Souter does not, on the other hand, intend to imply with his cynicism that the 
alert of a drug sniffing canine does not provide at least reasonable suspicion, and possibly 
probable cause, that drugs are present.  However, the initial question of whether canine sniffs are 
searches under the Fourth Amendment is a different issue requiring a different analysis.  See id. at 
413 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. at 413-14. 
 120. Id. at 414. 
 121. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 413. 
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Having asserted that canine sniffs are searches under the Fourth 
Amendment, Justice Souter then applied the Edmond rule that “the object of 
enforcing criminal law does not, without more, justify suspicionless Fourth 
Amendment intrusions.”122  Because the responding officer did not have 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that Caballes was carrying 
drugs in his car, Justice Souter turned to the Terry requirement that a search 
must be related to the purpose for the temporary detention in order to satisfy 
the Fourth Amendment.123  Absent some connection between speeding and the 
search for drugs, which accurately described the situation in Caballes, the 
canine sniff of Caballes’ vehicle constituted an unreasonable search in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.124  Consequently, Justice Souter would 
have deemed the marijuana discovered in Caballes’ trunk to be the “fruits” of 
an unlawful search125 and would have suppressed the evidence accordingly.126 
Finally, in responding to the majority opinion’s reliance on United States v. 
Jacobsen and its claim that state conduct revealing only contraband cannot be 
considered a search, Justice Souter pointed out that Caballes is distinguishable 
from Jacobsen because the state action in Jacobsen occurred when the 
contraband was already in the custody of the police, at a time when Jacobsen 
surely could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
contraband.127  For this and the other aforementioned reasons, Justice Souter 
concluded that canine sniffs are searches governed by the Fourth 
Amendment.128 
F. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent 
Building on Justice Souter’s brief mention of the applicability of Terry v. 
Ohio to the Caballes case, Justice Ginsburg also dissented from the Court’s 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine was first referred to in Nardone v. United 
States, in which the Court stated that it would exclude evidence (the “fruit”) that was gained 
through an unlawful search or seizure (the “poisonous tree”) or was gained as a direct result of the 
unlawful search or seizure.  Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).  While the taint 
from an unlawful search can be attenuated by discovery through an independent, untainted 
source, see, e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988), or through inevitable 
discovery by other means, see, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441 (1984), neither of these 
cases appears to be present here since no other source likely could have informed the police of the 
contraband in Caballes’ trunk and it was unlikely that the officers would have discovered the 
contraband anyway. 
 126. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 414 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 127. The state action in Caballes occurred when the contraband was still in the custody of 
Caballes, hidden in his trunk, away from public view. Id.  at 415-17 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 128. Id. at 415-17. 
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majority opinion.129  Agreeing with the Illinois Supreme Court in its analysis 
of the issues in Caballes, Justice Ginsburg began her analysis with an outline 
of the Terry doctrine, which requires that the officer’s stop of the individual be 
legitimate in its inception and that, absent new probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion, the officer not broaden the scope of the detention beyond that which 
led to the original stop.130  Acknowledging that the Court itself had previously 
analogized a traffic stop for a traffic violation with a Terry stop,131 Justice 
Ginsburg noted that the temporal scope of the traffic stop was not the only 
relevant factor in determining whether the canine sniff at issue 
unconstitutionally expanded the traffic stop.132  Consequently, Justice 
Ginsburg considered the vast difference in purposes of the traffic stop for the 
traffic violation itself and the subsequent canine search, concluding that the 
canine sniff, conducted for the purpose of enforcing criminal law outside of the 
traffic code, impermissibly expanded the scope of the traffic stop and was, 
therefore, unconstitutional.133  Justice Ginsburg did, however, note that canine 
sniffs for explosives presented a different issue, since explosives implicate a 
public safety rationale not present in the search for drugs.134 
Recognizing that the majority analyzed only whether the traffic stop itself 
was justified in determining whether Caballes’ rights were violated, Justice 
Ginsburg criticized the majority for failing to finish the analysis by applying 
the second prong of the Terry test.135  Unlike the majority, Justice Ginsburg 
would have applied Terry as such: The first prong was satisfied because the 
officer had probable cause to stop Caballes for speeding; the second prong was 
not satisfied, not because the stop was unreasonably prolonged but because the 
canine sniff broadened the scope of the stop since the sniff constituted a drug 
investigation and the stop was initially for a traffic violation.136 
Justice Ginsburg further challenged the Court’s decision for exposing both 
the potentially guilty and the potentially innocent to what will likely be 
stressful and embarrassing encounters with the police during what previously 
were routine traffic stops for traffic violations.137  Perhaps carrying the 
argument to the extreme, or perhaps foreshadowing future events, Justice 
Ginsburg expressed concern that the Court’s decision in Caballes would allow 
 
 129. Id. at 417 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 130. Id. at 418-19. 
 131. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). 
 132. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 420 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 133. Id. at 419-22. 
 134. Id. at 423. 
 135. Id. at 421-22. 
 136. Id. at 421-22. 
 137. Id. at 422.  The language in Ginsburg’s challenge regarding the potentially innocent 
appears to hint at the potential the Court’s holding has for resulting in pretextual stops or even 
harassment. 
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suspicionless canine sniffs of cars parked in public or even those stopped at red 
lights.138  Finding yet another problem with the Court’s holding, Justice 
Ginsburg noted that by giving the police the ability to conduct a canine sniff 
without any probable cause and even in light of a denial of consent to search, 
the Court effectively stripped individuals of the right to ignore and deny police 
requests to search.139 
Unsettled with the probable affects of the Court’s majority opinion, Justice 
Ginsburg would have held that the canine sniff during a routine stop for a 
traffic violation, without any probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the 
vehicle contained drugs, was a search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.140  Together, the dissents by Justices Souter and Ginsburg 
provide at least one alternative analysis the majority could have used, and they 
raise several unsettling concerns with the decision the majority did reach. 
IV.  SUBSEQUENT USES OF CABALLES 
While many courts have undoubtedly used Caballes in its least offensive 
manner,141 some courts have misapplied Caballes or applied the case in a way 
that magnifies the concerns raised by the decision.  In addition, courts have 
already applied the Caballes reasoning and analysis to situations arguably 
vastly dissimilar to that in Caballes, raising concerns for further implications. 
Some of the subsequent cases citing to Caballes have interpreted the 
“reasonableness” standard for the duration of a stop and sniff in such a way 
that may not withstand an actual “reasonableness” test.  For example, in United 
States v. Martin, the defendant was pulled over for speeding on a highway, and 
after thirty minutes of questioning by the stopping officer, the defendant 
waited twenty minutes for a drug-sniffing canine to arrive and waited another 
ten minutes before he was arrested for possession of a weapon and narcotics.142  
 
 138. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg’s concerns may 
seem far-fetched, but Lisa Madigan, attorney for the State of Illinois in Caballes actually stated in 
oral argument that she felt that, since canine sniffs are not searches, there would be nothing 
wrong with approaching people walking down the sidewalk and subjecting them to suspicionless 
canine sniffs.  See Oral Argument at 5-6, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923), 2004 WL 
2663949. 
 139. Caballes, 542 U.S. at 423 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. at 425. 
 141. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 355-56 (6th Cir. 2005) (justifying an 
initial canine sniff with the Caballes precedent but refusing to allow for a second canine to be 
brought to the scene after the initial canine did not alert); United States v. Williams, 429 F.3d 
767, 771-72 (8th Cir. 2005) (allowing for a canine sniff under Caballes reasoning when the 
officers already had suspicion that the car contained contraband). 
 142. United States v. Martin, 422 F.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2005).  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit accepted this prolonged detention because the questioning was 
warranted by the fact that Martin did not have a driver’s license with him and because reasonable 
suspicion of concealing contraband arose during the questioning.  Id. at 602. 
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Such a case seems to undermine assertions that canine sniffs typically take 
only a minute or even seconds to complete and do not inconvenience drivers.  
Furthermore, the “reasonableness” standard may be ineffective in 
distinguishing between what truly is a reasonable or justified duration and what 
is an unreasonable or purposefully elongated duration.  For example, the 
United States District Court for the District of Idaho in United States v. Brown 
held that just over five minutes was a reasonable length of time for an officer 
to complete a citation while waiting for a canine to arrive but stated that seven 
or eight minutes would possibly have been unreasonable.143  The court failed 
to explain exactly why less than two minutes may have made a difference in 
the reasonableness analysis.  In addition, when determining whether the 
duration of the stop was in fact reasonable, the court virtually ignored the 
stopping officer’s testimony that he  was “not going to let [the driver] go until 
such time as [the officer with the canine] arrived.”144  These cases are 
representative of the lack of guidance Caballes gave to officers and courts 
alike in determining the temporal bounds of detentions involving canine sniffs.  
An officer cannot be sure that the sixty minute limit approved of in Martin is 
actually acceptable or if the five to seven minute Brown standard is all that a 
court will consider reasonable.  Such uncertainty fails to restrain officers at the 
time of the stop and fails to inform courts at the time of trial. 
Magnifying a separate concern raised by the Caballes decision, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Johnson, 
specifically brushed aside the issue of a driver’s consent to search the vehicle, 
stating that “[Caballes] makes it irrelevant whether [the driver’s] consent for 
the dog sniff was voluntary.”145  In place of the voluntary consent issue, the 
court substituted the issue of whether the trooper initiating the stop had 
completed the citation process before the canine sniff occurred; finding that the 
sniff began before the citation was written, the court affirmed the lower court’s 
denial of Johnson’s motion to suppress.146  Similarly, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Ringgold that “the 
threat of a lawful dog sniff did not render [the detainee’s] consent involuntary” 
and cited Caballes as supporting the holding.147  In fact, the Court in Caballes 
did not even face the issue of voluntary consent.  Instead the courts in Johnson 
 
 143. United States v. Brown, No. CR05-73-S-EJL, 2005 WL 2847434, at *3 (D. Idaho Oct. 
26, 2005). 
 144. Id.  The court did state that it considered testimony that the officer was typically slower 
at writing citations because of his lack of experience; however, the court still appeared to give 
little to no weight to the officer’s admission that he was going to detain the driver until a canine 
arrived, an admission that in itself tends to show an intent to purposefully elongate the detention 
in order to obtain a sniff.  Id. 
 145. United States v. Johnson, 123 F. App’x. 240, 240 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 146. Id. 
 147. United States v. Ringgold, 132 F. App’x. 116, 118 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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and Ringgold seem to apply nonexistent assertions from Caballes.  The 
misapplication of Caballes in these cases speaks directly to the concern that 
the Caballes decision will not only shave away any significance of the power 
to decline consent to search one’s person or property but also, as Ringgold 
implies, diminish one’s ability to deny consent to search without threats or 
coercion. 
A slightly related analysis was applied by the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Michigan, Southern Division in United States v. 
Estrada-Jimenez.148  There, the court held that the owner of a vehicle had 
implicitly consented to a search of his car and that no unlawful search or 
seizure had occurred.149  In addition, however, the court applied the holding in 
Caballes to support an “inevitable discovery” analysis, stating that even if the 
search or seizure had been unlawful or the consent invalid, since a drug 
sniffing canine was present at the time of the search, the canine would have 
been permitted under Caballes to sniff the vehicle without probable cause and 
likely would have alerted to the drugs in the vehicle.150  This alert, the court 
reasoned, would have provided probable cause for the search of the vehicle.151  
The reasoning of the Estrada-Jimenez court not only provides a way to 
circumvent invalid consents but also unlawful searches and seizures, likely an 
unintended but possibly logical result of the Caballes holding. 
The United States Supreme Court in Muehler v. Mena, decided only weeks 
after Caballes, applied Caballes to justify police questioning of Mena as to his 
immigration status during a lawful detention.152  Analogizing the questioning 
in Muehler to the canine sniff in Caballes, the Court held that such questioning 
was constitutional so long as the questioning did not unreasonably lengthen the 
legal detention.153  While the application of the Caballes reasoning to the 
Muehler facts may not seem unjustified at first glance, such an application 
becomes more threatening when one views application of the Caballes 
decision as one way to justify increasing limitations on privacy and personal 
freedom.  If Caballes can be used to allow police more and more freedom of 
action during traffic stops, it is hard to imagine where free reign will end and 
the Fourth Amendment will again begin functioning. 
Likely the most disturbing usage of the Caballes precedent, however, came 
from two decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit and the Florida Court of Appeals for the Fourth District.  In United 
States v. Brock, the defendant argued a canine sniff outside his bedroom door 
 
 148. United States v. Estrada-Jimenez, No. 1:05-CR-21, 2005 WL 2277073 (W.D. Mich. 
Sept. 19, 2005). 
 149. See generally id. 
 150. Id. at 4. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100-02 (2005). 
 153. Id. 
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violated the Fourth Amendment, distinguishing his case from Caballes by 
pointing out the increased privacy interest in one’s house.154  The court 
disagreed, however, and held that the canine sniff did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.155  In making its decision, the court explained that the analysis in 
Caballes, not that in Kyllo, applied to the sniff outside Brock’s bedroom 
door.156  The court reasoned that the distinguishing feature between Brock’s 
situation and Kyllo’s situation was that the canine sniff in Brock could only 
reveal the presence or absence of contraband and no other private information, 
whereas the thermal imaging device in Kyllo could potentially reveal private 
information as well as evidence of contraband.157  In addition, the court 
stressed that the police officers using the canine entered the home with the 
consent of Brock’s roommate, implying that the situation was even more 
analogous to Caballes, in which the officer also was legally outside of 
Caballes’ vehicle.158 
In State v. Rabb, however, the Florida Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
District approached the issue and the Caballes precedent differently.  On 
remand from the United States Supreme Court,159 the Florida court drew the 
distinction between the privacy interest in a home and the privacy interest in an 
automobile that the Brock court was unwilling to make, stressing the increased 
Fourth Amendment protections provided to homes.160  The Florida court also 
differed from the Brock court in its analysis by analogizing the canine sniff 
used to smell what is inside the home with the thermal imager used to see what 
is inside the home and ultimately held that the canine sniff violated the Fourth 
Amendment.161  These differences between Brock and Rabb exhibit a serious 
problem with the Caballes precedent: Caballes may have unclear but vast 
implications for situations beyond that of a canine sniff during a valid stop for 
a traffic violation.162 
 
 154. United States v. Brock, 417 F.3d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 155. Id. at 697. 
 156. Id. at 696. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 697. 
 159. Florida v. Rabb, 544 U.S. 1028 (2005).  The fact that the Supreme Court vacated the 
Florida court’s previous decision and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the 
Caballes decision is slightly disturbing in that the Supreme Court appears to be implying that the 
Caballes decision has implications far beyond those in traffic violation situations.  See infra 
Section V(A), entitled “Concerns with the Court’s Decision” for an analysis of the problems that 
may arise from such implications. 
 160. State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
 161. Id. at 1182, 1192. 
 162. For an in-depth discussion of the implications of the Caballes decision for future sui 
generis devices, see Ric Simmons, The Two Unanswered Questions of Illinois v. Caballes: How 
to Make the World Safe for Binary Searches, 80 TUL. L. REV. 411 (2005). 
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The subsequent uses of Caballes in general point out and magnify the 
concerns raised by the Supreme Court’s analysis in the case.  At a minimum, 
they raise questions as to how lower courts are to interpret the 
“reasonableness” standard, what role consent plays in current Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, and even how far the Caballes precedent may be 
taken to chip away at Fourth Amendment protections. 
V.  AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS 
A. Concerns with the Court’s Decision 
As evidenced by the subsequent uses of Caballes in lower courts, the 
United States Supreme Court’s analysis and holding in Caballes present 
several concerns with the future application of the decision.  The Court’s 
“reasonableness” standard could prove unworkable or itself unreasonable.  The 
holding may allow pretextual stops with the intent of performing canine sniffs 
or may allow harassment or discrimination.  Finally, the decision also 
potentially undermines previous protections recognized under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The Court’s resolution of the temporal issue with a “reasonableness” 
standard leaves the issue virtually unresolved.163  Even before the Caballes 
decision, many cases involved courts allowing stops to be elongated while 
waiting for a drug sniffing canine to arrive on the scene or while waiting for 
the canine to perform its sniff.164  While these cases were not governed by the 
Caballes “reasonableness” standard, the courts reviewing the cases must still 
have felt that the durations were reasonable, since even the Terry doctrine 
requires that the detention not extend beyond what is reasonable and necessary.  
Subsequent to Caballes, courts have continued this trend, allowing for 
arguably over-extended stops in order to wait for or perform the canine 
sniff.165 
Furthermore, the Court’s decision in United States v. Sharpe166 may hold 
the “reasonableness” door open further than is actually “reasonable.”  There, 
the Court accepted an officer’s continued detention of a motorist where he 
justified the delay by explaining that he was awaiting an officer with more 
training and experience with such stops and diligently pursued the retrieval of 
 
 163. One author has argued that the temporal issue should not, in fact, be an issue at all, since 
holding that canine sniffs are simply not allowed during routine traffic stops would negate the 
need for a temporal limitation on the scope of the sniff.  LaFave, supra note 49, at 1895-96. 
 164. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 172 F.3d 775, 776-77 (11th Cir. 1999) (nearly one 
hour after the traffic violation stop began); United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 761 (11th Cir. 
1988) (nearly one hour after the conversion of the traffic stop into a Terry stop); Cresswell v. 
State, 564 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. 1990) (forty-five minutes after traffic violation stop began). 
 165. See supra Section IV, entitled “Subsequent Uses of Caballes.” 
 166. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985). 
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such an officer.167  While the Caballes holding arguably puts a limit on such 
practices with retrieval of canines, one can imagine the Court giving deference 
to an argument that obtaining a canine was diligently pursued and the police 
did everything in their power to complete the traffic stop as soon as possible or 
even that the stopping officer was awaiting an officer with more canine 
training to perform the sniff. 
Even if such a Sharpe rationale is later barred by the Court, as one author 
recognizes, several other tactics may be used to search the vehicle nonetheless: 
requesting information about the vehicle, the driver, or the driver’s criminal 
history; developing reasonable suspicion or probable cause, presumably 
through questioning or monitoring the motorist; requesting consent to search 
the vehicle, possibly even through threatening to obtain a drug sniffing 
canine.168  Whether these tactics would destroy an otherwise reasonable 
detention remains to be seen. 
In addition to the lack of clarity on the issue of “reasonableness,” the Court 
failed to fully consider the policy implications of its decision, which will allow 
police to use traffic stops as a pretext to searching for drugs.  While the 
Supreme Court rejected the pretext argument in Whren v. United States,169 the 
Court’s decision in Caballes may make the pretext problem more prevalent, 
eventually requiring a re-evaluation of the Court’s holding in Whren.  In giving 
police the go-ahead to utilize minor traffic violations as a valuable tool in the 
War on Drugs, the Court is essentially allowing police to target traffic violators 
in high-crime areas simply because such motorists may be more likely to have 
drugs in their vehicles.  In one example pre-dating Caballes but presumably 
allowed in light of the Supreme Court’s holding, the police stopped each and 
every vehicle with a minor traffic violation on the highway, not for the purpose 
of ticketing them, but rather for the purpose of running a canine sniff on the 
vehicles in order to search for drugs.170 
In a related aspect, the Court’s decision in Illinois v. Caballes also opens 
the door for allowing police to use canine sniffs in a discriminatory manner 
and for harassment purposes.171  Because the Court will no longer consider the 
 
 167. Id. at 686-87. 
 168. See Craig Scheiner, Time is of the Es’scents’: The Fourth Amendment, Canine Olfaction, 
and Vehicle Stops, 76 FLA. B.J. 26, 32 (2002). 
 169. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
 170. James A. Adams, The Supreme Court’s Improbable Justifications for Restriction of 
Citizens’ Fourth Amendment Privacy Expectations in Automobiles, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 833, 846 
(1999) (referring to United States v. Holloman, 113 F.3d 192 (11th Cir. 1997), where the police 
even told the motorist that they were searching for drugs). 
 171. LaFave, supra note 49, at 1896; Craig M. Bradley, Supreme Court Review: Saying No to 
Drug Roadblocks, 37 TRIAL 80, 81 (Apr. 2001) (noting that the dissenters in Edmond left this 
possibility open by forcing the majority to “vigorously insist that the use of the drug-sniffing dog 
did not doom [the] search”). 
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pretext argument, and because high-crime areas typically house minorities, the 
Court appears to have, perhaps inadvertently, left minorities more exposed and 
less protected by the Fourth Amendment, a result that offends equal protection 
values.  For example, it is unlikely that individuals in high-crime areas commit 
significantly more traffic violations than do individuals in lower-crime areas, 
but officers could target high-crime areas for traffic violation stops, ignoring 
the traffic violations in lower-crime areas, simply because they may then use a 
drug sniffing canine to search the car stopped in the high-crime area for drugs.  
While blatant discrimination may not be upheld by the Court in light of civil 
rights remedies against discrimination, so long as the police can cite a valid 
stop for a traffic violation, the detention of the motorist and any subsequent 
canine sniffs of the vehicle will presumably be valid and not necessarily 
discriminatory.172 
Allowing for suspicionless canine searches as part of a routine traffic stop 
also undermines both the consent doctrine and the prohibition against the 
“search incident to citation.”  This was reiterated in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent 
in Caballes when she recognized that “a sniff could substitute for an officer’s 
request to a bus passenger for permission to search his bag.”173  While 
Ginsburg applied the possibility to situations like that in Bond v. United 
States,174 where the officer theoretically could have asked for consent to search 
and then, when consent was denied, brought a drug sniffing canine aboard the 
bus to sniff the bag regardless, one can imagine the situation being used in the 
traffic stop context.  In fact, this appears to have been the situation in Caballes, 
and the court appears to have had no problem with this.  If officers can simply 
use the canine sniff regardless, the ability of a subject to deny consent in a 
suspicionless situation is essentially nonexistent. 
While the Court’s decision in Illinois v. Caballes dealt only with canine 
searches during traffic stops, the decision may have implications beyond the 
vehicle search.  As one student-authored casenote on Caballes points out, the 
Court may be headed down a slippery slope in that, as the Court chips away at 
what privacy interests are protected by the Fourth Amendment, citizens begin 
to expect less and less privacy.175  Under the Katz standard, the diminishing of 
reasonable expectations of privacy afforded to citizens affects whether a 
Fourth Amendment search has even occurred; if the subject of the search has 
 
 172. See John F. Decker et al., Curbing Aggressive Police Tactics During Routine Traffic 
Stops in Illinois, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 819, 836 (2005). 
 173. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 423 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 174. In Bond, the Court held that an officer’s squeezing a bus passenger’s bag, which was 
stored in the overhead bin, violated the Fourth Amendment because the passenger had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag, even though it contained drugs.  Bond v. United 
States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000). 
 175. Nina Paul & Will Trachman, Note, Fidos and Fi-don’ts: Why the Supreme Court Should 
Have Found a Search in Illinois v. Caballes, 9 CAL. CRIM. L. R. 1, 21 (2005). 
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no expectation of privacy because the Court’s previous decisions have stripped 
him of that expectation, then there is no search.  Likewise, if society does not 
believe that a subject’s expectation of privacy was reasonable because of the 
Court’s trend in limiting the expectation of privacy, then no search has 
occurred. 
To this extent, the second prong of the Katz test has become more a 
judgment of what the Court believes society should find is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy rather than what society actually does find is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  In essence, the Court may be laying a 
foundation for future narrowing of what is considered a search by reinforcing 
society’s diminishing expectations for privacy not just in cars but in other 
places where society currently feels that an expectation of privacy is 
reasonable.  For example, after the Caballes decision, society may move 
toward expecting canine sniffs to be performed on their cars, on their persons, 
even on their homes absent any probable cause for performing the sniffs.  If 
society in fact expects such sniffs, then there is no recognition of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in these places, at least against canine sniffs.  This 
result, stemming directly from the Court’s own actions, gives the Court less 
ammunition for striking down such sniffs because of the lack of a reasonable 
expectation.  In this way, the Court may find it difficult to stop itself from 
further expanding what is a “reasonable” search under the Fourth Amendment. 
Obviously, the Court’s analysis and holding in Caballes raises serious 
concerns.  The “reasonableness” standard provides little guidance for officers 
and courts and potentially may lead to vastly different standards in different 
jurisdictions.  The holding raises concerns regarding harassment or 
discrimination through pretextual stops for the purpose of performing canine 
sniffs.  Finally and perhaps most disturbing, the holding has the ability to 
undermine protections already recognized by the Court under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
B. Alternative Analyses 
While one team of student authors claimed the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Illinois v. Caballes violated established Fourth Amendment 
law,176 this was not the likely case.  Instead, the case was probably more that 
the precedents on which the Court relied in making its most recent decision 
were not consistent with the intended meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  In 
other words, although the Court followed established Fourth Amendment law 
as had previously been announced, the Court’s previous decisions themselves 
may be flawed.  Alterations in previous decisions would have significantly 
changed the Court’s decision in Illinois v. Caballes and perhaps led to a 
decision more in line with the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 176. See id. at 13. 
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The first problem with the precedents that the Court used in deciding 
Caballes is that the Court in Place incorrectly applied the Katz standard when 
it assumed that the Fourth Amendment does not protect against suspicionless 
searches of places where contraband may be contained.  For example, while 
precedent holds that individuals have a diminished expectation of privacy in 
their vehicles, the trunk seems to be more protected than the passenger 
compartment.177  This means that an individual has some expectation of 
privacy in his trunk, although not as much as he has in his house.  If this is 
true, then storing items of any sort in the trunk of a car would afford those 
items at least some level of protection.  Place held the opposite and would 
presumably allow a canine sniff of the trunk, disregarding the reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the trunk.  To that extent, Place incorrectly assumed 
that canine sniffs do not impinge upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
Certainly the court in Katz would not have considered the argument that using 
the electronic device to overhear Katz’s conversation did not constitute a 
search because Katz’s conversation itself was evidence of illegal activity.  The 
outcome in Place suggests that the argument could be made and may even be 
accepted by the Court. 
The Court’s reliance on Place is also unwarranted in that Place did not 
recognize that the reliability of canine alerts calls into question the sui generis 
nature of canine sniffs and, therefore, the Fourth Amendment implications of 
canine sniffs.  If canine sniffs are not truly sui generis, then they must be 
considered searches under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and require 
probable cause accordingly.  In many instances, the likelihood that a drug 
sniffing dog is alerting to something other than a “secret stash” of drugs is 
high.178  For example, in United States v. $639,558 in United States Currency, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia acknowledged 
that between seventy and ninety-seven percent of U.S. currency is tainted with 
enough drugs, often cocaine, that a drug sniffing canine can and will alert to 
the presence of the drugs on money.179  In that case, an alert to the trunk of 
 
 177. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 n.4 (1981). 
 178. See Jeffrey A. Bekiares, Comment, Constitutional Law: Ratifying Suspicionless Canine 
Sniffs: Dog Days on the Highways, 57 FLA. L. REV. 963, 971-972 (2005); Paul & Trachman, 
supra note 175, at 15-16; see generally Bird, supra note 97. 
 179. United States v. $639,558 in United States Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 714 n.2 (1992).  For 
other cases discussing the reliability of drug sniffing canines, see, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 
131 F.3d 1371, 1378 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 n.3 
(10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Limares, 269 F.3d 794, 797-98 (7th Cir. 2001); Laime v. State, 
60 S.W.3d 464, 475-76 (Ark. 2001); United States v. $242,484 in United States Currency, 351 
F.3d 499, 511 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds by rehearing en banc, 357 F.3d 1225 
(11th Cir. 2004). 
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someone’s car may simply be an alert that large amounts of money are present 
there, which in and of itself is not illegal.180 
In addition, even trained drug sniffing canines may “alert” to scents other 
than those from drugs.  In fact, in one case, a canine alerted to a girl’s person 
not because the girl was carrying drugs but because she had the smell of her 
own dog, which apparently was in heat.181  Dogs, regardless of their training, 
are still fallible animals; the chances of their alerting to something other than 
illegal contraband is at least a possibility, revealing that canine sniffs, in 
reality, are not sui generis.  While Justice Souter’s dissenting argument that a 
canine sniff is “the first step in a process that may disclose ‘intimate details’ 
without revealing contraband”182 may be countered by the fact that searches 
regularly disclose “intimate details,” Souter’s point implicates something 
slightly different than what his words actually say.  The result of a canine sniff 
may, at least in some cases, lead to a physical search by the police officer of an 
individual’s private places and things, without any actual probability that 
contraband existed among them.  The Fourth Amendment can bear searches 
revealing intimate details only if there is an actual probability (probable cause) 
that contraband is actually contained in the area of the search.  Under this 
analysis, the Fourth Amendment would apply to canine sniffs, and probable 
cause, in the case of a vehicle sniff or probable cause in the case of perhaps a 
residency sniff, would be required before such a sniff could be conducted. 
In addition to the problems with the actual canine sniff process, some 
lower courts have disregarded or distinguished Place and found that a canine 
sniff constituted a Fourth Amendment search after all.183  Like these cases, 
Illinois v. Caballes can be distinguished from Place.  In Place, the officers had 
reasonable suspicion that Place was carrying drugs in his luggage, thus 
authorizing a Terry stop of Place and a temporary detention of his luggage.184  
However, the police officer conducting the traffic stop involving Caballes had 
only probable cause that Caballes had violated a traffic ordinance.  He did not 
have probable cause, or even the reasonable suspicion present in Place, that 
Caballes was carrying contraband in his vehicle.185  This significant difference 
 
 180. Although a large amount of money may admittedly be evidence of illegal activity, the 
point is not that police officers would have no interest in the money or searching the trunk but 
rather that they would be required to obtain a search warrant or articulate probable cause that the 
money is connected to illegal activity in order to search the trunk. 
 181. Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (N.D. Ind. 1979). 
 182. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 413 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 183. See, e.g., United States v. $53,082 in United States Currency, 985 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 
1993); United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982); State v. Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d 805 (Neb. 1999). 
 184. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983). 
 185. People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 205 (2003) (acknowledging that the police had 
“nothing more than a vague hunch,” and not even a hunch of drug trafficking, but of “possible 
wrongdoing”). 
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suggests that Place may not have been the appropriate precedent to apply to 
Caballes, since the police in Place conducted the canine sniff precisely 
because of their reasonable suspicion. 
The Court in Caballes took another wrong turn in its analysis by relying 
upon its decision in Edmond.  The Court in Edmond ironically leaves the door 
open to canine sniffs as secondary purposes for roadblocks in the same opinion 
that it shuts the door to canine sniffs as primary purposes for roadblocks.186  
While one author seems to claim that Edmond supports a holding that drug 
sniffing by canines during a traffic stop is illegal because it has no relationship 
to the purpose for the traffic stop,187 this argument seems to be undermined by 
the Court’s implicitly leaving the door open for canine sniffs that are the 
secondary purpose of a roadblock.  After all, the canine sniff that occurs during 
a traffic stop at a roadblock with the primary purpose of stopping drunk driving 
is equally as unrelated to the purpose of the stop as is the canine sniff that 
occurs during a traffic stop for a traffic violation.188 
Only if the Court in Edmond had refused to allow canine sniffs at 
roadblocks altogether would Edmond support the “no relationship to the 
purpose” logic.  In fact, this likely would have been a more logical approach 
for the Court to take in Edmond, since the Court’s allowance of canine sniffs 
for secondary purposes completely defeats the purpose of its own ruling by 
allowing the police to now kill two birds with one stone: The police may still 
use canine sniffs, as they wished, but now they may also combine the sniff 
with other privacy intrusions, such as stopping motorists to check for drunk 
driving.  This essentially puts the driver in a worse, not better, position than the 
driver had been in before Edmond. 
Finally, had the Court properly applied the Terry two-pronged test to the 
Caballes case, the Court would have found that the canine sniff 
unconstitutionally broadened the scope of the traffic stop of Caballes.  While 
Terry involved the stopping and frisking of suspicious persons walking down a 
street, the Supreme Court has analogized the traffic stop with a Terry stop.189  
Even noting Illinois’ assertion that the Supreme Court did not mean for Terry 
to apply to traffic violation stops, the Court’s rejection of the ability to perform 
a search of a subject or his vehicle incident to citation in Knowles v. Iowa 
suggests that the Court also did not mean to give stopping officers unrestricted 
 
 186. Bekiares, supra note 178, at 967. 
 187. See LaFave, supra note 49, at 1896-97. 
 188. The analysis would be different, however, if the stop were for driving under the 
influence of drugs, instead of alcohol, in which the canine sniff would actually be related to the 
stop and presumably would not be legally troublesome.  Id. at 1895 n.308. 
 189. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (specifically stating that a traffic stop is 
more like a Terry stop than it is like a formal arrest).  While the Berkemer case dealt with whether 
Miranda warnings were required for conversations between a police officer and the subject of a 
traffic stop, the analogy is still applicable. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] SNIFFING OUT THE PROBLEMS 447 
ability to perform suspicionless searches on those who are stopped.  Therefore, 
Terry appears more applicable to the Caballes situation. 
Under Terry, only reasonable suspicion is required to temporarily detain 
and pat search an individual.190  Unfortunately for police officers and lower 
courts, the Court did not attempt to define the phrase “reasonable suspicion.”  
According to the Terry standard, the initial stop, here the traffic stop, must be 
legitimate, and any subsequent action must be related to the reason for 
initiating the stop.191  Had the Court applied these standards to Caballes, it 
would have found that, although the initial stop was valid, the subsequent 
actions of the officers, particularly in conducting the canine sniff, illegally 
broadened the scope of the stop since the initial stop had nothing to do with a 
police drug investigation. 
Regardless of possible flaws in the Court’s previous rulings and regardless 
of the fact that the Court was indeed following its Fourth Amendment 
precedent, the Court could have found the canine sniff of Caballes’ car to 
violate public policy based on pretext, discrimination and harassment, and 
even developing inconsistencies in the law, all of which are significant 
concerns raised by the Court’s actual decision in Caballes. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Court missed three distinct chances to rekindle the spirit of the Fourth 
Amendment and bar the use of suspicionless drug sniffing canines during 
traffic stops for traffic violations.  First, the Court could have corrected the 
precedent established in Place and Edmonds and held that canine sniffs are, in 
actuality, searches under the Fourth Amendment that illegally broaden the 
scope of the traffic stop.  Second, the Court could have applied Terry 
principles and the Terry standard and held that the canine sniffs, because they 
are unrelated to the initial reason for the stop, illegally broadened the scope of 
the stop, assuming no showing of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that 
the motorist was hiding drugs in his vehicle.  Finally, the Court could have 
rested a holding that canine sniffs during the course of a traffic stop for a 
traffic violation on public policy, since a contrary holding allows for 
widespread pretext stops, discrimination and harassment, undermines an 
individual’s ability to deny consent to search, and paves the way for further 
chipping away at Fourth Amendment protections. 
While the Court itself is unlikely to alter its analysis or holding in Illinois 
v. Caballes in subsequent cases, perhaps the concerns voiced nearly sixteen 
years ago by Judge Kogan of the Supreme Court of Florida in his dissent in 
 
 190. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).  The Court did reiterate, however, that a “severe 
requirement of specific justification” existed in order to breach an individual’s privacy.  Id. at 11. 
 191. Id. at 19-20. 
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Cresswell v. State will at least bring to light the practical effects of the 
decision: “If the zeal to eliminate drugs leads this state and nation to forsake its  
ancient heritage of constitutional liberty, then we will have suffered a far 
graver injury than drugs can ever inflict upon us.  Drugs injure some of us.  
The loss of liberty injures all.”192 
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